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AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER: DISABILITIES,
PATERNALISM, AND THREATS TO SELF
D. Aaron Lacy*
In the United States, at least forty-three million people
have disabilities.' "Discrimination denies people with dis-
abilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis with
others and costs the United States, local governments, and
the private sector billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and non-productivity."2 Discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities persists in critical
areas of society, such as employment.3 Individuals with dis-
abilities continually encounter various forms of discrimina-
tion, including overprotective rules and policies and exclu-
sionary qualification standards and criteria.
One example of an overprotective rule is the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) regulation in-
terpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act's (ADA) "direct
threat defense."4 The "direct threat defense" is a defense to a
valid claim of disability discrimination. The EEOC's regula-
tion allows an employer to fire or refuse to hire an individual
* D. Aaron Lacy has been a private practitioner in the state of Maryland
since 1997. His primary area of practice is Labor and Employment law. Mr.
Lacy serves as the legal representative for the Natural Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS), an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He repre-
sents NRCS with respect to claims asserting a violation of employment laws.
Mr. Lacy received his Juris Doctor from the University of Florida College of Law
and his LL.M. focusing on labor and employment law at American University
Washington College of Law. He would like to thank Associate Dean Robert
Dinerstein for his substantive edits of earlier drafts and Professor Susan Carle
for her editorial comments on earlier drafts. He would like to thank his first
and best teacher, his father, Fred Lacy.
1. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-558, at 3 (1990).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. II, at 7 (1990).
3. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-558, at 3.
4. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001). The EEOC's regulation is com-
prised of two parts: "threats to self' and "threats to others." This article is con-
cerned with only the first part, "threats to self."
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with a disability based solely on the basis that the individ-
ual's disability poses a threat to an individual's own safety,
assuming a reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or
reduce the threat." In 2002, the United States Supreme
Court held that this EEOC regulation was a valid exercise of
the EEOC's power delegated to it under the ADA.' This hold-
ing allows employers to treat people with disabilities differ-
ently from other minorities even though the courts and soci-
ety have refused to allow overprotective rules against
women.7 However, this paper will show that the Court has
allowed employers to claim they know what is best for indi-
viduals with disabilities and to continue to keep individuals
with disabilities as a subordinate class. As reflected in the
jurisprudence of the courts, society generally allows adults to
decide for themselves what risks are too great to take in
choosing where to work.8 However, when it comes to people
with disabilities, the Court has held that disabled individuals
cannot make decisions about what risks are too great in their
employment.!
The "threat-to-self' defense under the ADA is a paternal-
istic infringement on the right of a person with a disability to
make the decision to work in a dangerous environment. This
restriction infringes on the right of a person with a disability
to have full control and autonomy to make decisions about
what is in his best interest. The ADA was enacted to bring
people with disabilities out of their subordinated class and
onto the same level as others in society. ° However, the
Court's decision in Echazabal seems to counteract this initial
purpose by continuing to subordinate people with disabili-
ties." Because people with disabilities are viewed as existing
in a subordinate state, they are denied the right to sell their
labor skills in the market in the same manner as other
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2).
6. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
7. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that exclud-
ing women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs created a facial
classification based on gender and explicitly discriminated against women on
the basis of their sex under section 703(a) of Title VII).
8. See id.
9. See Echazaba], 536 U.S. at 74.
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III, at 446 (1990).
11. SeeEchazabal, 536 U.S. at 87.
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autonomous adults. 12 Denying this right to people with dis-
abilities denies them the right to "alienate" their labor skills
as they choose, while nondisabled people are allowed to alien-
ate their labor skills far more freely. Through these paternal-
istic rules under the ADA, people with disabilities are robbed
of their right to be truly free.
Nondisabled adults in society are allowed to work in in-
herently dangerous jobs. Police officers, fire fighters, window
washers, and scientists working with contagious diseases or
hazardous materials are just a few of the dangerous occupa-
tions that nondisabled adults are allowed to choose for them-
selves without intervention from society. Society even allows
adults to decide to discontinue their lives under certain cir-
cumstances. 4 Echazaba, however, holds that adults with
disabilities are not allowed to decide for themselves what em-
ployment situations are too dangerous for them to under-
take. 5 As a result of this paternalism, society continues to
subordinate people with disabilities.
Although other articles have been written about Echaza-
ha] and the direct threat defense, 6 this article approaches
12. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987).
13. Id.; see also infra notes 265, 267-68 (discussing Radin's concept of mar-
ket inalienability).
14. "Do Not Resuscitate" orders are common for individuals to agree to prior
to finding themselves in a life threatening situation. Under these orders, if a
person finds himself needing life support to remain alive, he can decide that no
extraordinary life saving measures can be used on him.
15. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
16. See Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA's Direct
Threat Defense, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (2001) (arguing that personal risk deci-
sions not affecting business operations are best left to the individuals who are
the targets of discrimination); Cynthia Nance et al., Discrimination in Employ-
ment on the Basis of Genetics: Proceedings of the 2002 Annual Meeting, Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools Section on Employment Discrimination Law, 6
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 57, 77 (2002) (arguing that "even applying the
EEOC's interpretation of the direct threat defense, the employer failed to prove
a direct threat because the plaintiff had worked for twenty years for a contrac-
tor with the same exposure and did not have any health problems"); Mark A.
Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability.: A Pro-
posal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 275
(2002) (arguing that the "direct threat defense should apply only when the risk
is immediate and severe"); Nathan J. Barber, Note, "Upside Down and Back-
wards:" The ADA's Direct Threat Defense and the Meaning of a Qualified Indi-
vidual After Echazabal v. Chevron, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 149 (2002);
Deborah Leigh Bender, Note, Echazabal v. Chevron: A Direct Threat to Em-
ployers in the Ninth Circuit, 76 WASH. L. REV. 859 (2001); Jonathan C. Drim-
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this topic from a completely different perspective, namely
that the EEOC's threat-to-self regulation is inconsistent with
the antipaternalist purpose of the ADA and liberal theory on
paternalism.
Part I of this paper discusses the history of disability leg-
islation." This section tracks disability legislation from the
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 to the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and traces the different philosophies that caused a
change in legislative approaches.18 Part I also reviews the
ADA from its humble beginnings to its current incarnation,
looking at the legislative history of the ADA and how Con-
gress's concern with paternalism affected the Act.19 Part II
examines the origins of the ADA's "direct threat defense,"
starting with the Rehabilitation Act of 197320 then looking at
its application in Strathie v. Department of Transportation"
and School Board of Nassau County Florida v. Arline.2 Part
II continues with a review of the EEOC's regulations inter-
preting the ADA, in particular the threat-to-self defense.23
Part III examines the threat to self as a subset of direct
mer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution
of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 1341 (1993); Douglas C. Heuvel, Case Note, Employment Discrimination -
Americans with Disabilities Act - Ninth Circuit Holds that the Direct Threat
Defense Is Not Available when an Employee Poses a Direct Threat to His Own
Health or Safety - Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.
2000), 54 SMU L. REV. 447 (2001); Adam B. Kaplan, Comment, Father Doesn't
Always Know Best: Rejecting Paternalistic Expansion of the Direct Threat De-
fense to Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 106 DICK. L. REV.
389 (2001); Katelyn S. Oldham, Comment, The Implications of Echazabal v.
Chevron, Inc. for Employees and for the Administration of Workers' Compensa-
tion and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 80 OR. L. REV.327 (2001);
Scott E. Schaffer, Note, Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.: Conquering the Final
Frontier of Paternalistic Employment Practices, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1441 (2001);
Sheehan Sullvan, Comment, Employers Beware: The Ninth Circuit's Rejection
of the Direct Threat to Self Disability Discrimination Defense in Echazabal v.
Chevron, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 517 (2001); David Yee, Current Event, Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002), 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC.
POL'Y & LAW 213 (2002). Except for the Yee note, all of these articles are about
"direct threat defense" generally, or about the Ninth Circuit decision, not the
Supreme Court decision.
17. See discussion infra Part I.
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.
19. See discussion infra Part I.B.
20. Reabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973).
21. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
22. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
23. See discussion infra Part II.
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threat defenses. 24 This section first discusses the split in the
circuits over whether to follow the guidance of the EEOC for
the threat-to-self defense,25 and then discusses the Court's
analysis of the threat-to-self defense." Part IV analyzes the
judicial history of paternalistic laws, rules, and regulations in
disability discrimination and shows how the Court's decision
in Echazaba] amounts to a paternalistic infringement on the
right of people with disabilities to make their own decisions to
work in environments that pose risks to them due to their
disabilities.27
I. HISTORY OF DISABILITY LEGISLATION
To understand the current state of disability legislation,
a review of prior disability legislation is in order. Compared
with persons without disabilities, people with disabilities are
much poorer, have far less education, have less social and
community life, participate much less often in social activities
than other Americans regularly enjoy, and express less satis-
faction with life.2" Historically, the physical and mental limi-
tations imposed by disabilities have been viewed as an inevi-
table consequence of the inferior economic and social status of
disabled people.29 Over the years, however, policy makers,
citizens with disabilities, the courts, and Congress have chal-
lenged this assumption. ° "Gradually, public policy affecting
persons with disabilities [has] recognized that many of the
problems faced by disabled people are not inevitable, but in-
stead are the result of discriminatory policies based on un-
founded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions, and deeply
24. See discussion infra Part III.A.
25. See discussion infra Part III.B.
26. See discussion infra Part III.C.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
28. Louis Harris & Associates, The ICD [International Center for the Dis-
abled] Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the
Mainstream, (1986) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 446 (1990)); see
also, The ICD Survey II: Employing Disabled Americans (1987); NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988);
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1986);
U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON THE HUMAN
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION (1988) (cit-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III, at 446 (1990)); U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983).
29. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 447-48 (1990).
30. Id. at 448.
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imbedded prejudices toward people with disabilities.""' These
discriminatory policies and practices affect people with dis-
abilities in every aspect of their lives, from securing employ-
ment and participating fully in community life, to securing
custody of their children and enjoying all of the rights that
Americans take for granted.32
A. History
During the 1960s, inspiration from other movements led
people with disabilities to launch their own civil rights
movement.3 Because of a visible uprising in other minority
communities, 4 people with disabilities sought greater societal
involvement. 5 The federal government led the charge to pro-
tect the rights of the oppressed minority groups.36
1. The Architectural Barriers Act
A movement began taking shape during the 1960s to in-
crease architectural accessibility to federal buildings. This
movement was based largely on the frustration that, even af-
ter being rehabilitated, people with disabilities were excluded
from entering the workplace because most buildings were
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1375.
34. See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons. Freedom of Expression
and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 104-06 (1990); see
also JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF
A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970, 129-219 (1983);
SARA M. EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979).
35. Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1375.
36. A few examples are the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352,
July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (guaranteeing access to employment, education, and
public accommodations); the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, Aug.
6, 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (guaranteeing access to political participation); and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 81 (guaran-
teeing access to housing) which were all passed specifically to end discrimina-
tion against African-Americans and at the same time establish the powers and
limits of government intervention in civil rights issues. See also RICHARD K.
SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS 6, 25 (2001). Because of civil rights
legislation that sought to protect other minority groups, people with disabilities
desired to obtain equal rights. See generally Edward V. Roberts, Into the Main-
stream: The Civil Rights of People with Disabilities, 10-11 C. R. DIG. 23, 23
(1979) (discussing the implications of the civil rights movement for people with
disabilities).
37. SCOTCH, supra note 36, at 29-31.
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physically inaccessible to them.38 In response, Congress en-
acted the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968.39 The Act re-
quired all new facilities built with federal funds to be accessi-
ble to people with disabilities."
Although Congress acknowledged that public buildings
should be accessible to people with disabilities, the Act only
applied to the construction of new facilities that were to be
owned or leased by the federal government.4 In passing the
Act without a provision requiring remodeling of existing
buildings, Congress implied that the cost of remodeling exist-
ing public buildings outweighed the right of people with dis-
abilities to enter those buildings." Furthermore, the Act con-
tained no enforcement provisions and suffered from
inconsistent compliance by federal agencies."' Although the
Act did not protect the rights of disabled people as extensively
as some would have preferred, it did acknowledge the rights
of people with disabilities by recognizing that the failure to
consider people with disabilities when planning initial con-
struction could result in discrimination."
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1972
Congress's next major effort to ensure the civil rights of
people with disabilities occurred in 1972 with the restoration
of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act." In the spirit of prior
amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1972 was designed to expand and im-
prove existing vocational rehabilitation programs.4'6  The
amendments demonstrated Congress's intent to provide equal
38. Curtis Brewer, Civil Rights Aspects of Disability, in DISABILITY OUR
CHALLENGE 107 (John P. Hourihan ed., 1979).
39. Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988)); see also 36
C.F.R. §§ 1190.1-1192.79 (1992) (setting the minimum standards for the federal
agencies charged with enforcement).
40. Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988)).
41. Id.
42. See42 U.S.C. § 4151(1), (3).
43. Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988)); see also 36
C.F.R. §§ 1190.1-1192.79.
44. Jack Achtenberg, "Crips" Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid for
the Disabled An Overview, 4 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 161, 171-78 (1975).
45. See generally H.R. 8395, 92d Cong. (1972).
46. Id. §§ 1-2.
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rights to people with disabilities. Congress intended to en-
able people with disabilities to become employable and pro-
ductive members of society.4' This move to integrate people
with disabilities into society shows that people with disabili-
ties can contribute to society and obtain community accep-
tance and societal recognition, so that people with disabilities
enjoy the same rights as any other member of society.
The philosophy of the vocational rehabilitation programs
was that rehabilitation increases the ability of a person with
a disability to contribute to society." However, according to
this philosophy, a person with a disability must be "cured"
prior to being employable and becoming a productive member
of society. This approach to rehabilitation creates problems
because it views a disability as a problem that can and must
be cured before a person can become a productive member of
society.5' However, people with disabilities can be productive
members of society while still being disabled.
The first major challenge to the notion that being dis-
abled meant lifelong economic dependency was the enactment
of the first Rehabilitation Act, the Fess-Kenyon Act of 1920,52
prompted by both the return of a vast number of disabled
World War I veterans and an ever-increasing incidence of in-
dustrial accidents." "By the mid-1960s, the integration of
disabled people into the mainstream of American life was the
explicit goal of rehabilitation policy."'
3. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
A major shift in public policy relating to disability culmi-
47. Id.§3.
48. See S. REP NO. 93-319, at 2 (1973); 119 CONG. REC. 24,588 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Williams).
49. Paul K. Longmore & Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social
Prejudice, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 141, 158 (1987).
50. See S. REP. No. 93-318, at 2 (1973); 119 CONG. REC. 24,588 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Stafford); 119 CONG. REC. 5882 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Cranston); see also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 443 (1991).
51. See S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 8011 (1973); 119 CONG. REC. 5893 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Stafford); 119 CONG. REC. 5882 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Cranston); Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 443 (remarking that certification of a
disability by a medical expert is objectionable to people with disabilities).
52. Fess-Kenyon Act, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 735 (1920).
53. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III at 448 (1990).
54. Id.
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nated in the passage of a broad anti-discrimination provision,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."5 Section 504
states that "In]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance."56  Congress
wrote this section with the intention of remedying past dis-
crimination by prohibiting discrimination against people with
disabilities in any program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance. Section 504 recognized that discrimination
results from action or inaction, and that discrimination occurs
by effect as well as by intent or design."
With the passage of the final version of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 59 Congress used sweeping language that af-
fected nearly all government contracts, programs, and activi-
ties, and established affirmative action hiring practices for
federal agencies and contractors." "From a civil rights per-
spective a profound and historic shift in disability public pol-
icy occurred in the 1970's. '61 Through landmark litigation
and legislation, Americans with disabilities were recognized
for the first time as a minority group that was subject to dis-
crimination, and worthy of basic civil rights protections.62
Thus, Congress created section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 to respond to continued discrimination against people
with disabilities in all areas of societal involvement and to
advance the basic civil rights protections of people with dis-
abilities. Section 504 acknowledges that, as in the Supreme
Court finding fifty years ago in Brown v. Board of Education,
55. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, §504, 87 Stat. 355, 394
(1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
56. H.R. 8395, 92d Cong. § 604 (1972); see also Judith W. Wegner, The
Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without
Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 403-04 (1984).
57. See H.R. 8070, 93d Cong. (1973).
58. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 (1985) (quoting a statement
by Senator Humphrey that section 504 would be ineffective if it did not rectify
harms resulting from the effects and designs of discriminatory action).
59. Title IV of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat.
355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 780 (1973).
60. Id.
61. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 448 (1990).
62. Id.
20031
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segregation for persons with disabilities "may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."63
4. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974
The Rehabilitation Act gave the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare the responsibility of issuing regula-
tions to interpret and implement section 504 after its enact-
ment in 1973.6 Prior to the issuance of the interpretive regu-
lations, however, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1974,65 which clarified the new law. One of
these amendments redefined "handicapped individual."66 In
this new definition of "disability,"67 Congress considered the
fact that attitudinal and physical barriers could keep people
with disabilities from fully participating in society.' With
these considerations in mind, Congress included section
111(a) in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974,69 which
states that a handicapped individual is one "who (A) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record
of such impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such im-
pairment."" This definition places more emphasis on the cul-
63. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
64. SCOTCH, supra note 36, at 60-120.
65. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat.
1617 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
66. Id. § 111(a), 88 Stat. at 1619 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991)). The specific definitions of "physical or mental impairment," "major
life activity," and "has a record of such an impairment" are stated in the 1978
regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (1992).
67. See David A. Larson, What Disabilities Are Protected Under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 229 (1986); John Parry, Supreme
Court Turns Aside Assault on § 504, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
74 (1987). Cases interpreting the definition of disability include Sch. Bd. of Nas-
sau County. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that the definition of"handi-
cap" was broad enough to encompass tuberculosis and remanding the case to
determine whether the individual was otherwise qualified for the job); Jasany v.
United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985) (determining that the
definition of impairment at issue must be evaluated with reference to the indi-
vidual job seeker); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (concluding that the inability to obtain a single job does not render one
handicapped); E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980)
(concluding that an impairment that interfered with an individual's ability to
obtain satisfactory employment was not otherwise substantially limiting within
the meaning of the statute).
68. Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1386.
69. See S. REP. NO. 93-1297 (1974).
70. Pub. L. No. 93-516, §111(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974) (codified at 29
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tural effects of disability discrimination and less emphasis on
curing the disability itself. The definition recognizes that
people who have had a disability in the past or are considered
to have a current disability can also suffer discrimination."
This change in the definition of a disability began to alter the
treatment of people with disabilities and has remained the
definition of disability in the latest federal disability legisla-
tion. 2 In spite of Congress's efforts to ensure the civil rights
of people with disabilities, Congress waited more than four
years to issue any regulations. As a result, in the late 1970s,
many people with disabilities and disability rights groups
grew tired of waiting for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to pro-
tect the civil rights of the disabled, and engaged in sit-ins to
force the administration to issue regulations. 3 Consequently,
the Rehabilitation Act was amended again in 1986 to change
the term "handicapped individual" to "individual with handi-
caps."74 This change in term is significant because it suggests
that society began to view a person with a disability not as
disabled first and a person second, but as a person first and
disabled second.
5. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act
The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act begins with a statement of purpose describing that
the Act is meant to assist the states in ensuring that people
with developmental disabilities receive the care, treatment,
and other services necessary to enable them to achieve their
maximum potential. 5 One of the congressional findings in
the bill of rights provision states that treatment, services, and
habilitation programs to assist people with developmental
disabilities should be designed to maximize the individual's
U.S.C. §705 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
71. SeeArline, 480 U.S. at 279-80, 284-88.
72. Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1387.
73. Mary Jane Owen, The Sit-In that Changed Our Lives, RAGGED EDGE,
May-June 1997, at 9-10.
74. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 103(d)(1),
100 Stat. 1807, 1810 (1986). Later "individual with handicaps" was changed to
"person with a disability." Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. III 1991)).
75. Developmental Disabilities Assistance Bill of Rights Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-402, § 101(b), 104 Stat. 1677 (2000).
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potential and developmentally disabled people should be pro-
vided for in a setting that is least restrictive of the their per-
sonal liberties.76
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
As a result of the increased awareness of the rights of
people with disabilities, President George H. W. Bush signed
into law the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a com-
prehensive civil rights bill affecting people with disabilities
and the nation as a whole.7 Because it is modeled after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADA extends many of the re-
quirements contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.7' Al-
though the ADA provides important new rights to people with
disabilities in employment, transportation, and other public
services public accommodations, and telecommunications,79
the attempt to elevate this historically under-protected class
to the same societal level with all other citizens falls short of
the intended goal.8"
1. Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities
Act
The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate to end discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities and to bring those individuals into
the economic and social mainstream of American life."' The
ADA was first introduced in 1988 during the 100th Con-
gress. 2 This first bill was drafted by the National Council on
the Handicapped, an independent federal agency charged
with assessing the condition of people with disabilities and
making legislative recommendations.8 3  The ADA was rein-
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2003).
78. Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1397.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 447 (1990).
80. Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1397.
81. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III at 446.
82. See id.
83. The National Council on the Handicapped is now called the National
Council on Disability and was first established by Title IV of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 780 (Sept. 26, 1973), as an advisory board within the Department of
Education. The Council was transformed into an independent federal agency by
the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221, 98 Stat. 17
(1984).
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troduced in a modified form in the 101st Congress.84 This bill
establishes a clear and comprehensive prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of disability in employment, public
services, public accommodations, and telecommunications."
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment against a qualified person with a disability.86 The un-
derlying premise of this title is to avoid the exclusion of per-
sons with disabilities from job opportunities unless they are
actually unable to do the job.8" The requirement that job cri-
teria actually measure skills required by the job is a critical
protection, because stereotypes and misconceptions about the
abilities and inabilities of persons with disabilities continue
to be pervasive.8 Thus, the ADA assumes that discrimination
occurs against people with disabilities primarily because of
stereotypes, discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears
about increased costs and decreased productivity.88
Society constantly hears people with disabilities de-
scribed as "either an object of pity or a source of inspiration."9
The "poster child" elicits pity from society. 1 Society believes
that the poster child is someone who needs help because he is
not able to help himself. The "supercrip" provides inspiration
to society. 2 Through the supercrip, society learns that a dis-
ability is something that can be overcome, and people with
disabilities deserve pity instead of respect until the disability
is overcome."
Constant depictions and images of disabilities in popular
culture, religion, and history have caused people with dis-
abilities to become sensitized to these images. 4 These images
become reinternalized by society, cause social stereotypes,
84. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III at 447.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 454.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 30 (1993).
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 30. The portion of the chapter goes on to discuss the appearances
in literature of people with disabilities, such as Charles Dickens's Tiny Tim,
Shakespeare's Richard III, Steinbeck's Lenny from Of Mice and Men, and
Freddy Krueger from Nightmare on Elm Street. Id. at 30-31.
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create artificial barriers, and add to the discrimination and
subordinate status with which many people with disabilities
must deal.95 Paternalism is perhaps the most pervasive form
of discrimination faced by people with disabilities.9" The legis-
lative history of the ADA clearly shows that one of Congress's
purposes under the ADA was to ensure that employers may
not deny a person an employment opportunity based on pa-
ternalistic concerns regarding the person's own health.97
Thus, the antipaternalistic purpose of the ADA addresses the
societal concern with depictions of people with disabilities.
2. Congressional Concern with Paternalism
Congress found that discrimination against people with
disabilities often results from false presumptions, generaliza-
tions, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, and
irrational fears." In addition, Congress noted that individu-
als with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including overprotective rules and exclusion-
ary qualification standards,99 based on characteristics that
are beyond their control and result from stereotypic assump-
tions that are not truly indicative of the individual's ability to
participate in and contribute to society.'0 ° Often, society's
first reaction is to automatically underestimate the abilities
of people with disabilities.'0' Paternalistic assumptions by
nondisabled people keep people with disabilities from accom-
plishing the same things that people without disabilities are
able and allowed to accomplish.0 2
Discrimination comes in all forms, including subtle forms
such as paternalism, which is based on the insulting assump-
tion that people with disabilities are not able to make their
own decisions and lead their own lives as nondisabled people
are allowed to do.' °3 Because of societal discrimination in the
95. Id. at 30.
96. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 30.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000).
100. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
101. SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 19.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 25-26. Shapiro tells a story of Tiffany Callo ("Callo"), a woman
with cerebral palsy, who had to fight for custody of her two children. Id. Cali-
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form of paternalism, the ADA provides a valid qualification
standard that requires a person not to pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace, in-
cluding coworkers or customers, but not the employee him-
self."M The drafters of the ADA decided specifically to state
clearly in the statute that, as a defense to a claim of discrimi-
nation, an employer could prove that an applicant or em-
ployee posed "a significant risk to the health or safety of oth-
ers which could not be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation."'0' This is a restatement of the standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau
County v. Ariline0  In Aniine, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged a similar standard, using the phrase "significant health
and safety risk.""0 7 Fearing that Gene Arline, a school
teacher, might infect others at work, the school board dis-
missed her after she suffered two relapses of tuberculosis.'
The issue before the Court was whether contagious diseases
are included in the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handi-
cap.""0 9 In concluding that they are, the Court reasoned that
Congress had extended the Act's protection both to those who
are actually disabled and to "those who are regarded as im-
paired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a ma-
jor life activity." ' 10 In doing so, "Congress acknowledged that
fornia welfare officials thought that Callo was too physically disabled to care for
them and thus were willing to pay the bill for expensive foster care rather than
fund several hours a day of in-home child care to support Callo. Id. Shapiro
also tells the story of Sharon Kowalski, who was seriously disabled from a head
injury in an automobile accident. Id. Kowalski was not allowed to leave a nurs-
ing home to live with her former roommate, Karen Thompson. Id. The court
questioned whether Kowalski's judgment was sufficient to make such a deci-
sion. Id. Disability rights attorney Timothy Cook, now deceased, complained
that the judge's failure to honor Kowalski's clearly stated wishes was part of the
"infantilizing of people with disabilities," and that "[w]e're treated like eternal
children." Id.
104. 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03, S9697 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of
Mr. Kennedy).
105. Id.
106. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
107. Id. at 287.
108. Id. at 281.
109. Section 706(8)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act defines "handicapped indi-
vidual" to mean any person who "(i) has a physical ... impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. §
706(8) (1995).
110. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
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society's accumulated myths and fears about disabled and
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from actual impairment."'' Indeed, "[flew aspects of
a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear and mis-
apprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or
have recovered from such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy
or cancer have faced discrimination based on the irrational
fear that they might be contagious.""' 2
Thus, the Court recognized that unfounded or irrational
fears can be disabling, and that the ADA must be interpreted
to prohibit actions based on such debilitating assumptions."'
The Court also recognized that employers could have "legiti-
mate reasons" for not extending job offers to persons whose
disabilities might present a danger to others."' A well-
founded conclusion that Arline posed a substantial risk of
contagion would justify her dismissal."' The Court reasoned:
[A] person who poses a significant risk of communicating
an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be
otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accom-
modation will not eliminate that risk. The Act would not
require a school board to place teacher with active, conta-
gious tuberculosis in a classroom with elementary school-
children.
116
Nonetheless, "[t]he fact that some persons who have con-
tagious diseases may pose a serious health threat to others
under certain circumstances does not justify excluding from
the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived
contagious diseases.""' 7 The Court offered specific guidance
on how to determine whether Arline's tuberculosis posed a
significant risk to others."8 "[I]n most cases, the district court
will need to conduct an individualized inquiry and make ap-
propriate findings of fact.""' 9 An individualized inquiry was
required to achieve Congress's goal of "protecting handi-
capped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice,
111. Id. (internal citations omitted).
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 284-85.
114. Id. at 285 n.14.
115. Id.
116. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
117. Id. at 285.
118. Id. at 287.
119. Id.
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stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate
weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding
exposing others to significant health and safety risks."12°
However, the ADA specifically refers to health and safety
threats to others. 2' As stated earlier, the legislative history
clearly notes that one of Congress's purposes under the ADA
is to ensure that employers may not deny a person an em-
ployment opportunity based on paternalistic concerns regard-
ing the person's own health.122 For example, as sponsor Sena-
tor Kennedy explained, under the ADA an employer could not
use an excuse for not hiring a person with HIV that the em-
ployer was simply "protecting the individual" from opportun-
istic diseases to which the individual might be exposed.
123
The individual should deal with this concern in consultation
with his or her private physician.'24
Another central purpose in passing the ADA was Con-
gress's view that it was critical that paternalistic concerns for
the safety of a person with a disability must not be used to
disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant. 2' The drafters
argued that based on the standards in the ADA, a denial of
employment to a person with a disability based on general-
ized fears about safety would violate the ADA.126 By defini-
tion, such fears are based on averages and group-based pre-
dictions, and the ADA mandates individualized
assessments. 1
27
Fear is also one of the strongest emotions people with
disabilities elicit from nondisabled people. 28  Fear lies be-
neath the "compassion for the poster child and celebration of
the supercrip."29 One example is anthropologist Robert Mur-
phy, who studied his own condition as a person with a disabil-
ity after suffering a spinal cord injury which left him a para-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03, S9697 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of
Mr. Kennedy).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 354.
126. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 28 (1989).
127. Id.
128. SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 38.
129. Id.
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plegic.'3 ° He stated that people with disabilities:
[C]ontravene all the values of youth, virility, activity and
physical beauty that Americans cherish. We are subvert-
ers of the American Ideal, just as the poor are betrayers of
the American Dream. The disabled serve as constant,
visible reminders to the able-bodied that the society they
live in a counterfeit paradise, that they too are vulnerable.
We represent a fearsome possibility. So society shields it-
self from this fearsome possibility by distancing disabled
people and subordinating them or in other words treating
them as social inferiors.
131
Therefore, the congressional concern with paternalism in
enacting the direct threat defense in the ADA was based on
eradicating irrational societal fears about people with dis-
abilities.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE ADA's HARM TO SELF PROVISION
As noted previously, Title I of the ADA bars discrimina-
tion against a "qualified individual with a disability" in re-
gard to hiring, firing, promotion, or any other "terms, condi-
tions and privileges of employment."'32 Prior to the passage of
the ADA, the direct threat defense appeared in section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 33 and was tailored after the provision
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination in any federal program or activity on the basis
of race, color, or national origin.Y3 4 Section 504 came on the
heels of unsuccessful efforts to amend Title VI in order to
prohibit the exclusion of a person from federal programs or
activity "on the ground of ... physical or mental handicap""'
and to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order
to make unlawful employment discrimination "because of
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). The Act's employment provisions apply to
employers with fifteen or more employees, employment agencies, labor organi-
zations, and joint labor-management committees. Id. § 12111(2), (5)(A).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
134. Robert Burgdort Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Defi-
nition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 419-20 (1997) (discussing that the
Senate staff used the language of Title VI to add an antidiscrimination provi-
sion to the Rehabilitation Act).
135. Id. at 417-19.
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physical or mental handicap."'36 After its first appearance as
an amendment to section 504, the direct threat defense took
its final form in Arline.'37 Because the ADA drafters relied on
both of these earlier sources in drafting the ADA direct threat
defense, proper statutory interpretation of the direct threat
defense requires an understanding of these prior sources.'38
In 1973, the Rehabilitation Act did not include any lan-
guage amounting to a direct threat defense.'39 A disabled per-
son's ability to perform the job was only part of the inquiry
into whether the person was an "otherwise qualified" individ-
ual. 4° The regulations initially implementing the Rehabilita-
tion Act provided that a person who posed a significant risk to
the health and safety of others was not otherwise qualified for
the job.141 With the amendments to the Rehabilitation Act in
1978, the direct threat defense was codified, but only for peo-
ple who were substance abusers.' Congress rejected a pro-
posal to exclude all recovering substance abusers from the
136. Id.
137. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard
than the standards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulation issued Federal agencies pursuant to such
title."); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that inter-
pretation of ADA terms is "informed by interpretations of parallel definitions in
previous statutes and the views of various administrative agencies which have
faced this interpretive question."). The ADA's legislative history makes refer-
ences to the Rehabilitation Act and Ariline on many occasions. See H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485, pt. III, at 454-57 (1990), H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 76 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 3549, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-585.
139. Cf Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (holding that
a nursing program applicant was not otherwise qualified because her hearing
impairment prevented safe performance of the training program and the full
range of nursing responsibilities required by the state nursing board).
140. Nondiscrimination on Basis of Handicap, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.60 (1999).
141. Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Development Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(6)(c), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85
(1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994)).
142. See 124 CONG. REC. 30,322 (1978):
[T]he term "individual with a disability" does not include an individual
who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered
entity acts on the basis of such use or include any individual who is an
alcoholic whose current use of alcohol prevents such individual from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
reason of such current alcohol abuse, would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20)(C)(i), (v) (2000).
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definition of handicapped individual."' Congress instead
adopted language which excluded only those persons who
were alcoholics and recovering drug abusers and "whose cur-
rent use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual(s) from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose em-
ployment ... would constitute a direct threat to property or
the safety of others.' 44  Courts then adopted this approach
with respect to impairments other than substance abuse.
145
Four agencies were responsible for interpreting the Re-
habilitation Act: 46 the EEOC, Department of Labor, Depart-
ment of Justice, and Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices."' While the EEOC adopted regulations which
recognized a threat-to-self defense along with a threat-to-
others defense, 4 ' the other three agencies, adopting regula-
tions under the Rehabilitation Act, did not recognize a threat
to self.' 9 Therefore, most of the agencies that interpreted the
direct threat provision did not recognize a threat-to-self com-
ponent of the provision.
One major case addressing the direct threat defense un-
der the Rehabilitation Act is Strathie v. Department of Trans-
portation.50 Cited often in House and Senate Reports accom-
panying the ADA,' Strathie provides an outline for
evaluating the direct threat defense. This case involved a
challenge to a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
143. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (repealed 1998); see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (re-
pealed 1998) (excluding individuals who, because of a currently contagious dis-
ease or infection, "would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals").
144. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982); see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994).
145. See, e.g., Strathie v. Dep't. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983); Doe
v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
146. Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 82 (2002).
147. Id.
148. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2002).
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1990) (Department of Labor); 28 C.F.R. § 42.540
(1990) (Department of Justice); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1990) (Department of
Health and Human Services). The EEOC determined that a threat to self is
consistent with the legislative history of the ADA and the case law interpreting
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It is not clear why the EEOC added
threat to self under section 504, and the EEOC gives no reason for this action.
The EEOC does give a reason why it took the same action under the ADA-its
action was consistent with the legislative history of the ADA and the case law
interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
150. 716 F.2d at 227.
151. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-116, at 27 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303-39.
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regulation requiring that school bus drivers be able to hear at
certain decibel levels without the use of a hearing aid.15
James Strathie proved that he could satisfy the regulation's
hearing requirement, but only if he wore his hearing aid.'53 In
all other respects, he was qualified to drive a school bus."' He
challenged the suspension of his license, alleging, among
other things, that the regulation violated section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act by not making accommodations to allow
the use of hearing aids."' The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendants, and Strathie appealed.56
Vacating the district court's summary judgment, the
Third Circuit reasoned that Strathie was "otherwise quali-
fied" only if his requested modifications or accommodations
would not require "modification of the essential nature of the
program" or "place undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on
the recipient of federal funds.""' 7 The court rejected as over-
broad the Department's insistence that the essential purpose
of the licensing program was "to insure the highest level of
safety" by "eliminate[ing] as many potential safety risks as it
can.""8 The court noted that, the Department had granted li-
censes to drivers with other impairments in cases where the
152. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 228.
153. Id. at 228-29.
154. Id. at 229.
155. Id. at 229-30 (citing Southeast Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-
13 (1979)). The Court derived this analytical framework from Davis. Davis in-
volved a nursing school's determination that a prospective student with a seri-
ous hearing impairment was not otherwise qualified to participate in its train-
ing program. Davis, 442 U.S. at 400-01. The Court held that an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual is one who can meet all the program's re-
quirements in spite of her handicap. Id. at 406. Because the Court credited the
district court's findings that Davis's hearing impairment "actually prevent[ed]
her from safely performing in both her training program and her proposed pro-
fession," id. at 403, its opinion provided little insight into the nature or severity
of the anticipated risks. Instead, the opinion focuses on Davis's contention that
the nursing program should have modified its program to permit her to partici-
pate. Id. at 407-14. The Court concluded that the modifications she requested
were not mandated by the Rehabilitation Act because they would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the program, thereby exceeding the reasonable modifi-
cation that the Act might require. Id. at 409-13.
156. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 413); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1613.705 (1983) (providing that selection criteria, which screen out
handicapped individuals, must pertain to essential functions of the program in
question).
157. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 412; Nelson v.
Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 379-82 (E.D. Pa. 1983)).
158. Id. at 232.
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impairment was "likely to interfere with the ability to drive a
school bus with safety."'59 In addition, the Department had
granted licenses to drivers who must wear eyeglasses to meet
the vision standards, despite the risk that a driver might take
off or lose his eyeglasses, thereby creating a danger to the
passengers."' To the court, this "indicate[d] that the De-
partment views some safety risks as too remote to justify the
denial of a school bus driver's license."'' 1  Accordingly, the
court identified the essential purpose of the program as "pre-
vent[ing] any and all appreciable risks that a school bus
driver will be unable to provide for the control over and safety
of his passengers."'' 2
The court then considered the possibility of any modifica-
tions which would eliminate any appreciable risks without
imposing an undue burden on the Department.'63 The issue
before the court was whether "accommodating a wearer of a
stereo hearing aid would present an appreciable risk to the
safety and control of school bus passengers."'6 4 The court re-
manded the case for the district court to determine the an-
swer to this issue in light of the facts of this case.'6' Thus,
Strathie stands for the proposition that the exclusion of all
people with disabilities-as opposed to excluding only those
for whom a reasonable accommodation would not eliminate
an appreciable risk-violates the Rehabilitation Act.'
III. THE ADA'S HARM TO SELF PROVISION
The ADA is codified under three main titles. 67 Title I
prohibits discrimination in employment;'68 Title II prohibits
159. Id. (citing 67 PA. CODE § 71.3(b) (2001)). These impairments included
"(1) color blindness, (2) respiratory disfunctions [sic], (3) rheumatic, arthritic,
orthopedic, muscular or neuromuscular disease, and (4) mental, nervous, or-
ganic or functional diseases," as well as loss or impairment of a foot, leg, arm,
hand, or fingers. Id. (citing § 71.3(b)(2)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 232.
164. Id. at 234.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. II 1990), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990).
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2000). Title I of the ADA applies to all employers
with fifteen or more employees, other than the federal government and private
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discrimination in state and local government programs;..d169Title III prohibits discrimination by private entities in provid-
ing public accommodations.at The Act delegates to the EEOC
regulatory and enforcement authority over Title I of the
ADA.a Pursuant to congressional direction, the EEOC has
promulgated formal regulations defining such terms as "di-
rect threat" and "qualified individual.g These interpretive
regulations have caused substantial controversy and com-
mentary, most notably on the EEOC's expansive interpreta-
tion of the direct t y defense to include a harm-to-self pro-
vision. 173
The ADA defines the term "direct threat" to mean "a sig-
nificant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 4  However, the
EEOC defines the term "direct threat" to mean "a significant
risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individ-
ual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reason-
able accommodation." 17  In addition to these regulations, the
EEOC published a technical assistance manual "to help em-
ployers ... and persons with disabilities learn about their ob-
ligations and rights under the employment provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.,, 7  As with the interpretive
membership clubs. Id. § 12115. In addition to employers, Title I also applies to
employment agencies, labor organizations, and labor-management committees.
Id. § 12111(2).
169. Id. §§ 12131-50.
170. Id. §§ 12181-89.
171. Id. § 12116 ("Not later than one year after [the date of enactment of this
act] ... the Commission shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry
out this subchapter in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5...
172. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2002).
173. See, e.g., Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 599 (7th Cir.
1999) (declining to decide the "tough question" of whether "an employer [may]
use the ADA as a sword to keep off the job an employee who is qualified to do
that job now, but will, at some future point, become unable to do so due to a de-
generative disease, which will be exacerbated by the employee's continued em-
ployment"); see also Amanda Wong, Comment, Distinguishing Speculative and
Substantial Risk in the Presymptomatic Job Applicant: Interpreting the Inter-
pretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Direct Threat Defense, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2000) (discussing the controversy at length).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2001) (emphasis added).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(1) (1993) (explaining that "[e]ach federal agency
that has [the] responsibility... for implementing [the ADA] may render techni-
cal assistance to individuals and institutions that have rights or duties under
the respective subchapter"). In addition, the EEOC technical assistance manual
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regulations, the technical assistance manual is routinely cited
by courts as guidance on congressional intent in enacting the
ADA.
177
A. The Direct Threat Provision
The ADA and EEOC regulation both set out provisions
addressing the "direct threat" defense.7 8  However, as men-
tioned previously, those provisions seem to contradict each
other because the regulations expand upon the statutory
definition. The ADA itself does not define direct threat 179 as
including threats to self, whereas the EEOC's regulations
do. 80 The term of art in use is "direct threat," which, as noted
previously, can encompass two very different approaches with
different levels of restrictiveness on the job options for people
with disabilities. This paper will use more precise terms by
dividing the direct threat defense into two concepts: threats
to others and threats to self.
B. Circuit Split over the Threat-to-self Provision
Only a few courts have addressed the narrow issue of
whether the direct threat provision extends to threats to the
person with a disability when threats to others do not exist. 8'
Many courts have addressed whether the provision applies to
direct threats both to oneself and to others,'82 but only the
states "the ADA recognizes legitimate employer concerns and the requirements
of other laws for health and safety in the workplace. An employer is not re-
quired to hire or retain an individual who would pose a 'direct threat' to health
or safety." EEOC, Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions
(Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act § 4.4 (1992). The EEOC techni-
cal assistance manual, however, is ambiguous because it does not specify if a
direct threat is a threat to self or threat to others.
177. See, e.g., Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Gas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th
Cir. 2001) (referring to the manual's interpretations), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
201 (2001); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir.
1998) (citing the manual); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 87 (3d Cir. 1997) (indi-
cating that the manual "underscores" the ADA).
178. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. II 1990),
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
179. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
180. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2001).
181. See Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996); see also
Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 00-1406); Kohnke v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
182. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998)
(explained infra note 196); see also Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers,
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Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois have specifically addressed the
issue of whether threats solely to the person with a disability
are encompassed within the direct threat defense.'83
1. Case Law Accepting Threats to Self as a Defense
The case that follows used the EEOC's regulation of
threats to self in its analyses. In Moses v. American Non wov-
ens, Inc.,"M Moses, an epileptic employee, brought suit against
American Nonwovens alleging that the company fired him in
violation of the ADA."'5 Moses worked as a product inspector,
web operator and hot splicer assistant.' "As a product in-
spector, Moses sat on a platform above fast-moving press roll-
ers."'18 "As a web operator, he sat underneath a conveyer belt
with in-running pinch-points."'88 "As a hot splicer assistant,
he worked next to exposed machinery that reached tempera-
tures of 350 degrees Fahrenheit."8" The opinion of the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the EEOC's regula-
tions, which state that an employer may fire an employee if
the disability causes the employee to be a threat to his own
health or safety. 9 ° The court found that Moses' seizures
caused him to be a threat to himself, because his assigned
Inc., 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (explained infra note 196).
183. The determination of whether an individual poses a direct threat, ac-
cording to the EEOC, is made on a case-by-case basis. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
This individualized assessment must be based on a reasonable medical judg-
ment that relies on (1) the most current medical knowledge, and/or (2) the best
available objective evidence. Id. The EEOC has also enumerated certain fac-
tors that may be considered when determining whether an individual poses a
direct threat to others or himself, including the duration of the risk, the nature
and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will
occur, and the imminence of the potential harm. Id. § 1630.2(r)(1)-(4). How-
ever, the Supreme Court, in Arline determined the factors to be considered were
(1) the nature of the risk (e.g., how the disease is transmitted), (2) the duration
of the risk (how long the carrier is infectious), (3) the severity of the risk (what
is the potential harm to third parties), and (4) the probabilities the disease will
be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
184. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
185. Id. at 447.
186. Id. at 447-48.
187. Id. at 447.
188. Id. at 447-48.
189. Id. at 448.
190. Moses, 97 F.3d at 447 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(r) (2001)).
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tasks involved working around dangerous equipment.' Be-
cause Moses presented no evidence that he did not pose a
threat to himself or that any reasonable accommodation could
be made to eliminate the threat, the court affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer.'92
Moses argued unpersuasively that American Nonwovens
failed to investigate his condition and failed to consider possi-
ble accommodations.'93 When American Nonwovens fired
Moses, it knew he was taking medication for his epilepsy;
however, his medication was not controlling his seizures. 4
The court found difficulty with American Nonwovens' failure
to investigate possible accommodations, but ultimately the
court was not persuaded that American Nonwovens' failure to
investigate relieved Moses of his burden of producing proba-
tive evidence that reasonable accommodations were avail-
able. "'95 In comparison, other cases that arguably allow
threats to self as a defense are not really threats to self cases
but actually involve threats to others. 96
191. Id. at 447-48.
192. Id. at 448.
193. Id.
194. Id. The court argued that this is not a case in which the employee, al-
though diagnosed as epileptic, had never suffered a seizure, and the employer
had no basis for concluding that he was likely to suffer one. Id.
195. Id. The court reasoned that a contrary holding would mean that an em-
ployer would be liable for not investigating even though an investigation would
have been fruitless. Id.
196. See, e.g., LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir.
1998). A line cook at the defendant's restaurant, LaChance had a history of
seizures. Id. at 833-34. Duffy's fired LaChance following two seizures during
work hours. Id. LaChance's supervisor provided testimony that line cooks were
required to cook on a flat top gas grill, use a "fryolater" filled with hot grease,
and use slicing machines. Id. at 834. Duffy's also provided testimony that a
person with the type of seizures LaChance experienced should be restricted
from working with such machines and that LaChance posed a threat of harm to
himself and others while working around those appliances. Id. As in American
Nonwovens, the court found that LaChance failed to produce adequate evidence
that he was not a threat to others or that Duffy's could have provided a reason-
able accommodation to eliminate the threat. Id. at 836. As a result, the court
upheld the district court's summary judgment on behalf of Duffy's. Id. at 836.
The Fifth Circuit applied a similar standard in Rizzo v. Children's World
Learning Centers, Inc., 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000). Children's World Learn-
ing Centers employed Rizzo, who was hearing impaired, as a teacher's aide. Id.
at 211. As one of her duties, Rizzo transported children to and from school in a
van. Id. Rizzo was relieved of her driving duties because Children's World
Learning Centers had concerns about Rizzo's ability to safely operate the van
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2. Case Law Rejecting Threats to Self as a Defense
In Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,'97 Kohnke, a customer
service agent, suffered injuries to his neck, elbow, back, and
leg and took a medical leave of absence. 9 ' He alleged em-
ployment discrimination in violation of the ADA when Delta
invoked Kohnke's disability as grounds for refusing to place
Kohnke back into his customer service agent position when
he returned to work. 9' Kohnke sought reconsideration of the
magistrate judge's ruling that the direct threat jury instruc-
tion should refer to a threat to the employee or to others,
rather than to others only.00 The district court granted the
motion for reconsideration and concluded that any direct
threat jury instruction should refer to a threat to others only
and not to the employee himself.2 .'
After considering the statutory language, legislative his-
tory, and interpretive case law, the district court held that a
direct threat must refer to a direct threat to others, not
merely to the person himself.2 2 The court first determined
that the ADA was clear in referring to "a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace," and
not to the individual himself.0 3 Second, the court observed
that the House Judiciary Report on the ADA mentions a
threat "to other individuals" or "to others" many times, with-
out ever mentioning a threat to the disabled person himself. '
Another case that clearly presents only a threat-to-self
and supervise the children in the van at the same time. Id. The court's deter-
mination in favor of Rizzo turned on evidence that she could operate the van
safely without causing a threat of harm to the passengers. Id. The court did
not evaluate whether Rizzo caused a threat of harm to herself. Id. However,
the court applied the EEOC's standard, which included an analysis of potential
threats both to the children and to Rizzo herself. Id. Although the court in
Rizzo looked at the threat Rizzo posed to others, it did so by applying the EEOC
regulation. Id. Therefore, this case does not squarely fit under case law accept-
ing the threat-to-self defense. See id.
197. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1113.
200. Id. at 1110.
201. Id. at 1113.
202. Id. at 1111.
203. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1111 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994)).
204. Id. at 1112 (citation omitted). The court found only non-precedential
case law dealing with the difference between the language of the ADA and the
EEOC's regulation specifically. Id. at 1113. The only similar case found was an
unpublished opinion that was deemed to have little precedential value. Id.
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issue is Echazabal v. Chevron US.A., Inc."5 In Echazabal,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the ADA's "direct threat" provision applies to an employee or
applicant for employment who poses a threat of harm to him-
self, where a threat to others does not exist.2"6 In 1992,
Echazabal applied for a job at Chevron, where he had worked
for over twenty years as a contract employee." 7 Chevron of-
fered Echazabal a position, contingent upon his passing a
physical.2"8 Based on the results of the physical, Chevron de-
termined that Echazabal's liver was releasing enzymes at an
abnormally high level and concluded that exposure to the sol-
vents and chemicals present at the refinery might cause fur-
ther damage to his liver.2 9 As a result, Chevron rescinded its
job offer.2"0 Echazabal subsequently consulted private physi-
cians, who diagnosed him with asymptomatic, chronic active
hepatitis C.2 ' Echazabal explained to his physicians the na-
ture of his job and the chemicals he would be working
around.212 His doctors, however, advised Echazabal that the
chemicals and solvents would cause no further damage to his
liver.213 Echazabal continued to work at the oil refinery as a
contract employee, and re-applied for a permanent position a
few years later. 14 Again, Chevron offered him a position con-
tingent upon his passing a physical, but rescinded the em-
ployment offer after Echazabal failed the examination.21 '
Chevron feared that he would suffer additional damage to his
liver if he worked at the refinery with the chemicals and sol-
vents.2 6 This time, however, Chevron prohibited Echazabal
from continuing to work on the premises with any contrac-
tor.2
17
On the basis of these facts, the district court entered
205. 226 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3314
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 00-1406).
206. See id. at 1064.
207. Id. at 1065.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
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summary judgment in favor of Chevron, reasoning that the
direct threat provision of the ADA encompassed threats to
self.218 However, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's judgment, 21 and held that the ADA's direct threat de-
fense does not apply to a person with a disability who only
poses a threat of harm to himself."' The court of appeals
found that in drafting the ADA's direct threat provision, Con-
gress intended to codify the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the similar provision in the Rehabilitation Act,221 as inter-
preted in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.222 Be-
cause Arline's holding does not refer to harm to the individual
himself, the Echazabal majority reasoned that Congress in-
tended for the direct threat provision in the ADA to encom-
pass threats to others but not to self. 3
The court of appeals also looked to the plain meaning of
the ADA's direct threat language.224 In light of both the text
and the legislative history, the court of appeals ruled that the
EEOC's interpretive regulations defining "direct threat" as
encompassing threats to self contradicted congressional in-
tent when Congress enacted the ADA.22 The court stated:
"[Chevron's] reading of 'essential functions' would... circum-
vent Congress's decision to exclude a paternalistic risk-to-self
defense in circumstances in which an employee's disability
does not prevent him from performing the requisite work." '226
218. Id. at 1064.
219. Dissenting, Judge Trott would have affirmed the district court's holding.
See id. at 1075 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott believed that Echazabal was
not "otherwise qualified" for the position, because he could not perform the es-
sential functions of the position. Id. at 1073. Trott reasoned that because of
Echazabal's disability, the essential functions at issue might have killed him.
Id. at 1073-74. Further, Judge Trott asserted that the oil refinery was entitled
to use the "direct threat" defense, citing other circuits that had addressed the
issue. Id. at 1074.
220. Id. at 1072.
221. Id. at 1067 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990)).
222. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). In Arline, the Supreme Court held that a teacher
diagnosed with tuberculosis was not automatically excluded from coverage un-
der the Rehabilitation Act without an objective and individual inquiry based on
prevailing medical knowledge. Id. at 287-89.
223. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000).
224. See id. at 1065-70.
225. See id. at 1069-70.
226. Id. at 1071. While the Ninth Circuit's decision in Echazabal preserves
the right of disabled employees to make employment decisions that affect their
own health or safety, the ruling also raises several policy concerns. Some policy
concerns raised by the decision are employer exposure to tort liability, id. at
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In making their rulings, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois followed the literal language of the ADA's direct
threat defense, while the Eleventh Circuit followed the
EEOC's definitions. To date, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is the only appellate court to reject the EEOC's
regulations that expand the direct threat provision to threats
to the individual himself, although the U.S. Supreme Court
later overruled the decision rejecting the EEOC's definition.2 27
Because the Ninth Circuit's decision conflicted with another
court of appeals decision in ADA direct threat cases,228 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.229
C. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Threats to Self
In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Echazabal" the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously held that the ADA allows the EEOC regu-
lation that permits an employer to refuse to hire people with
disabilities when job performance may pose a threat of harm
to those people.231 The Court held that the EEOC regulation
struck an appropriate balance between employment regula-
tions and workers' rights.232 The Court stated that "the EEOC
was certainly acting within the reasonable zone when it saw a
difference between rejecting workplace paternalism and ig-
noring specific and documented risks to the employee himself,
even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of
getting a job., 233 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with
its opinion. 4
In its decision, the Court stated that because "Congress
has not spoken exhaustively on threats to a worker's own
1070, employers committing state crimes, id. at 1074, conflicting responsibilities
for employers under different labor laws, id., nullification of state and federal
workplace safety laws, id. at 1074-75, and antipaternalism trumping basic
safety concerns. Id. at 1075.
227. See id. at 1063, rev'd, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
228. See Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447-48 (11th Cir. 1996).
229. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d at 1063, revd, 536 U.S. 73
(2002).
230. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
231. Id. at 74-75; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 2002).
232. See Bob Egelko, High Court Ruling Called Setback for Disabled, Ill, S.F.
CHRON., June 11, 2002, at A4.
233. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86.
234. See id,
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health," the EEOC could claim administrative deference 235 as
long as the qualification standards remain "job-related and
consistent with business necessity."2 36 The Court stated that
the Ninth Circuit's argument relied on the interpretive ex-
pression, expressio unius exclusion alterius.2 7 The Court
gave three reasons not to apply the expression-exclusion
rule.28  First, the Court stated that Congress included the
harm-to-others provision as only an example of a legitimate
qualification that is "job related and consistent with business
necessity."29 Second, the Court reasoned that by failing to in-
clude both threats to others and threats to self, Congress ap-
pears to have made a deliberate choice to omit the latter item
as a signal of the affirmative defense's scope.240  Third, the
Court found "no apparent stopping point to the argument that
by specifying a threat-to-others defense, Congress intended a
negative implication about those whose safety could be con-
sidered."241' Further, the Court stated that the EEOC regula-
235. The Court articulated this form of deference in yet another Chevron-
related case, Chevron USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the un-
ambiguously expressed intent of Congress).
236. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84 (limiting agency discretion to the condi-
tions of qualification standards and quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(a) (1994 & Supp.
2002)).
237. Id. at 80. This expression means "expressing one item of an associated
group or series excludes another left unmentioned." Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. The Court stated that "[t]hese are spacious defensive categories,
which seem to give an agency or court discretion in setting limits for permissible
qualification standards." Id. The expansive phrasing of "may include" does not
fall into the sort of exclusive terminology of the exclusion-expression rule. Id.
240. Id. The Court noted that "two reasons stand in the way of treating the
omission as an unequivocal implication of congressional intent." Id. at 82. The
first reason is that "the EEOC was not the only agency interpreting the Reha-
bilitation Act, with the consequence that its regulation did not establish a clear,
standard pairing of threats to self and others." Id. As stated earlier, "[w]hile
the EEOC did expand upon the text of the Rehabilitation Act exclusion by rec-
ognizing threats-to-self along with threats-to-others," the Department of Jus-
tice, Labor and Health and Human Services adopted regulations under the Re-
habilitation Act did not recognize threats-to-self along with threats-to-others.
Id. The second reason is that "[i]nstead of making the ADA different from the
Rehabilitation Act on the point at issue, Congress used identical language,
knowing full well what the EEOC had made of that language under the earlier
statute." Id. at 83. The Court reasoned that "[o]mitting the EEOC's reference
of self-harm while using the very language that the EEOC had read as consis-
tent with recognizing self-harm is equivocal at best." Id.
241. Id. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen Congress specified threats to oth-
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tion advanced the goals of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act);141 thus the Court's position sup-
ported Chevron's defense. 43
Most significantly, the Court decided that although Con-
gress had paternalism in mind when it enacted the ADA, the
ers in the workplace, for example, could it possibly have meant that an em-
ployer could not defend refusal to hire when a worker's disability would
threaten others outside the workplace?" Id. at 83-84. The Court used the ex-
ample of a meat packer being defenseless to a suit by Typhoid Mary if she had
been turned away. Id.
242. 29 U.S.C. §§651-78 (1994 & Supp. 2002) (intending to reduce safety and
health hazards, injuries, and illness in work environments); see also id. § 651(b)
(assuring "every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions"). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA) mission is to work closely with state and federal governments to save
lives, prevent injuries and protect the health of American workers. See OSHA,
U.S. Dep't of Lab., OSHA's Mission, available at
http://www.osha.gov/oshinfo/mission.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
243. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84-85 (dismissing Echazabal's allegations
that Chevron's reasons for calling the EEOC regulation reasonable are illegiti-
mate). Chevron claimed that the EEOC regulation helps avoid lost time due to
illness, curbs excessive turnover caused by medical retirement or death, de-
creases state tort litigation, and minimizes the risks of violating the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act. Id. at 84. Echazabal responded that there are no
known instances of OSH Act enforcement against an employer who relied on the
ADA to hire a person with a disability willing to accept health or safety risks on
the job. See Brief for Respondent at 36, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536
U.S. 73 (2002) (No. 00-1406) (indicating that OSHA has no rule requiring em-
ployers to exclude employees with Hepatitis C). Echazabal further argued that
although Chevron relied heavily on the Occupational Safety and Health Act's
"general duty" clause, imposing only a duty of feasible prevention, Chevron did
not identify any case in which OSHA enforced such clause. Id. at 37-38; see also
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2002) (mandating that employers furnish a
workplace free from recognizable hazards that may cause serious bodily harm
or death). However, the Court asserted that this fact was not "a red herring to
excuse covert discrimination." See Echazahal, 536 U.S. at 84 (emphasizing that
employers would escape liability just by disclosing all risks and "taking all fea-
sible steps to mitigate those risks."); see also Brief for Respondent at 37. With
this fact in mind, the Court replied that the OSH Act requires employers to pro-
vide safe working conditions, and compels employees to be in compliance with
the OSH Act while at work. See 29 U.S.C. § 654 (outlining duties of employers
and employees for compliance with occupational safety and health standards).
In addition, although the OSH Act and the ADA may appear to operate with
conflicting purposes in this type of case, see Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 85 (contrast-
ing the Occupational Safety and Health Act with the ADA by indicating that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act seeks to ensure the safety of workers,
whereas the ADA seeks to eliminate employment discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities), when permitted by Congress, agencies are allowed
and expected to resolve conflicting statutes. See id. at 85 (highlighting that the
EEOC's efforts exemplify an agency's responsibility to resolve statutory conflicts
when Congress leaves competing objectives subject to administrative resolu-
tion).
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EEOC regulation was reasonable because it did not allow the
type of paternalism in employment that the ADA was enacted
to eradicate. 44 The Court reasoned that Congress was not
aiming at an employer's refusal to place individual disabled
workers in demonstrated risks; instead, Congress was trying
to get at refusals claiming to act for the good of people with
disabilities that were in fact relying on untested pretextual
stereotypes."'4 The EEOC regulation disallows just this sort
of sham protection, and instead demands an individualized
particularized inquiry into the harms the employee would
probably face.2"6 The threat to self "must be 'based on a rea-
sonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evi-
dence,' and upon an expressly 'individualized assessment of
the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of the job."'2 47 The Court reached this decision only
after considering, among other things, "the imminence of the
risk and the severity of the harm portended."48 In other
words, the Court argued that two types of paternalism ex-
isted: good paternalism and bad paternalism, and the ADA
was enacted to eradicate bad paternalism. The Court rea-
soned that although paternalistic, the EEOC regulation con-
stituted the good type of paternalism, because it requires an
individualized inquiry into the threat of harm to the employee
instead of allowing the use of generalized stereotypes against
an entire class of people with disabilities.249 Thus, consistent
with the ADA's purpose, the EEOC's regulation focused on
eliminating workplace protections that were based on false
presumptions.250
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court
overlooked its extensive jurisprudence rejecting paternalism
in employment law. In 1991, for example, the Court held, in
UA W v. Johnson Controls,25' that fetal protection policies that
prohibit women of child-bearing age from working in posi-
tions that are potentially harmful to their fetuses are a form
244. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 85.
245. Id. at 85.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 86.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 85-86.
250. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85-86 (2002).
251. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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of discrimination based on sex in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.62 Based on evidence that exposure to lead in
very early pregnancy can harm fetuses, Johnson Controls im-
plemented a policy that prevented women capable of bearing
children from working in jobs with possible lead exposure.2 53
In rejecting the company's defense that sex was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for jobs involving lead ex-
posure, the Court stated "[o]ur cases have stressed that dis-
crimination on the basis of sex because of safety concerns is
allowed only in narrow circumstances. 254  The Court nar-
rowed further the use of the BFOQ defense to situations
where the third parties the business seeks to protect "were
indispensable to the particular business at issue."255 The
252. Id at 211.
253. Id. at 191-92.
254. Id. at 202 (discussing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1997)).
In Dothard, the Court held that excluding women from employment as security
guards at a men's maximum security Alabama prison was constitutional due to
the risk of possible injury not only to female guards themselves, but also to in-
mates or other guards. 433 U.S. at 335-36. Because twenty percent of the pris-
oners were sex offenders who were not separated from the prison population,
the Court reasoned that there was a substantial probability of an attack on a
female guard. Id. at 355. The Court explained that an essential element of the
position was to maintain order and security, and the presence of females in this
male penitentiary, notorious for its "jungle atmosphere," was incompatible with
this goal. Id. at 334-55. The Dothard Court relied on the very narrow BFOQ
defense, and found that normally an employee would be allowed to choose which
employment risks are acceptable. Id. at 355. In Dothard, the Court found per-
missible an employer's policy of hiring only male guards in contact areas of
maximum-security male penitentiaries because more was at stake than the "in-
dividual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment," but
indicated that danger to a woman herself, absent the danger to others, did not
justify discrimination. Id. In upholding the BFOQ defense, the Court noted that
the employment of a female guard in male penitentiaries where sex offenders
were spread throughout the prison population would create real risks of safety
to others if violence broke out because of the female guard's presence. Id. at
336. In addition, the Court noted that "some courts have approved airlines' lay-
offs of pregnant flight attendants at different points during the first five months
of pregnancy on the ground that the employer's policy was necessary to ensure
the safety of passengers." Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211 (citing Harriss v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980)); Burwell v. E.
Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558
F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977)).
255. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203-04 (noting that in Dothard and W.
Air Lines, Inc., v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985), the third parties poten-
tially affected were indispensable to the particular business at issue). The Court
noted:
In Dothard, the third parties were the inmates; in Criswel], the third
parties were the passengers on the plane. We stressed that in order to
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Court summarized its position by noting:
Unless pregnant employees differ from others "in their
ability or inability to work," they must be "treated the
same" as other employees "for all employment-related
purposes." This language clearly sets forth Congress' rem-
edy for discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and po-
tential pregnancy. Women who are either pregnant or po-
tentially pregnant must be treated like others "similar in
their ability.., to work." In other words, women as capa-
ble of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not
be forced to choose between having a child and having ajob. 256
In Echazabal, the Court held that Johnson Controls was
not controlling because it falls under Title VII, which is "con-
cerned with paternalistic judgments based on the broad cate-
gory of gender, while the EEOC has required that judgments
based on the direct threat provision be made on the basis of
individualized risk assessment."
257
Comparable in nature to a "qualification standard" that
screens out people with disabilities, the ADA's direct threat
defense must be "job-related and consistent with business ne-
cessity"25 and should be limited to those instances where a
person with a disability cannot perform the functions of the
job or puts others at harm in doing the job.259 If the particular
harm is only to oneself, the person is not unable to do the job
and cannot be barred from doing so. Any other result contra-
venes the anti-paternalistic purpose of the ADA.
qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification must relate to the "'essence,"' or
to the "central mission of the employer's business". . . Third-party
safety considerations properly entered into the BFOQ analysis in
Dothard and Criswell because they went to the core of the employee's
job performance. Moreover, that performance involved the central pur-
pose of the enterprise. . . . No one can disregard the possibility of in-
jury to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it
transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of battery
making.
Id. (citations omitted).
256. Id. at 204 (relying on the Pregnancy in Discrimination Act's amendment
to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)) (citations omitted).
257. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 85-86.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) (1994).
259. Id.
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IV. PATERNALISM AND THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES
The decision by the Supreme Court in Echazabal fails to
acknowledge the anti-paternalistic purpose of the ADA. As
discussed in Part I, the central purpose of the ADA was to
bring people with disabilities out of a subordinate state and
onto the same level as all other individuals.26 ° This includes
allowing people with disabilities to take risks that are more
severe because of the person's disability. For example, the
ADA would allow a person with a disability to drive a school
bus even though he had a hearing impairment as long as he
can perform the essential functions of his job without posing a
threat of harm to the passengers. The EEOC's rule seems to
view people with disabilities as incapable of making decisions
as to what is best for them.
This approach belies the classic liberal thought under-
pinning much of the legal doctrine applied to nondisabled
people's ability to choose risky occupations, 6' and this ap-
proach belies the classic liberal thought of when the law may
interfere with legal subjects' rights to autonomous decision
making. Under liberal theory, state intervention in autono-
mous decisions of individuals is justified primarily when the
results of such decisions may cause harm to another person.
The EEOC regulation, however, allows intervention in the
autonomous decisions of people with disabilities even in the
absence of any claim of harm to others. As such, the regula-
tion meets the classic definition of unwarranted paternalism.
Paternalistic policies and rules restrict a person's liberty,
but are justified exclusively by consideration for that person's
own good or welfare when carried out against his present
will. 262 The classic liberalist John Stuart Mill excluded as a
possible legitimizing principle for invading a person's liberty
the prevention of harm to the actor himself.263 Mill said,
His own good, either physical or moral is not sufficient
260. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
261. See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (June 2000);
infra text accompanying notes 292-94 (discussing Viscusi's concept of risk eq-
uity).
262. Richard J. Arneson, Mill Versus Paternalism, ETHICS 470, 471-72
(1980).
263. 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
SELF 3 (1986).
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warrant. He cannot be rightfully compelled to do or for-
bear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to
do so would be wise . . . . These are good reasons for re-
monstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuad-
ing him or entreating him, but not for compelling him or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.26
Thus, under a classical liberal approach to employment
law, transactions such as selling your labor to the highest
bidder for whom you want to work are core decisions that
fully autonomous people have the power to make with com-
plete freedom. To state this in another way, one may rely on
Professor Margaret Radin's concept of market-inalienability
in the context of selling one's labor in the labor market.
Radin explores nonsalability, a type of inalienability she calls
market-inalienability.265 Professor Radin explains that there
are "two theories about freedom that are central to the ideo-
logical framework in which we view inalienability: the notion
that freedom means negative liberty,266 and the notion that
negative liberty is identical with, or necessarily connected to,
free alienability of everything in the markets." '267 The belief
that freedom means negative liberty gives rise to the idea
that inalienabilities, i.e., a rule prohibiting a person from sell-
ing his or her labor on the best terms he or she can get, are
paternalistic limitations on freedom.268
Thus, Radin and Mill reject the principle that that pre-
vention of physical harm to the actor himself is an appropri-
ate reason for invading the liberty of a person by restricting
his right to alienate his labor.269 As applied to law, this prin-
ciple is called "legal paternalism.""27 Legal paternalism has
been exhaustively explored by the contemporary liberal theo-
rist Joel Feinberg, who draws a distinction between two dif-
ferent types of paternalism.27' These two types of paternalism
are (1) presumptively blamable benevolent paternalism and
264. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Bobbs Merrill, 1956) (1871).
265. Radin, supra note 12, at 1849.
266. Liberty in this context means autonomy or a right.
267. Radin, supra note 12, at 1898.
268. Id.
269. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 4.
270. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 30-34, 38 (1963).
271. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 5.
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(2) presumptively nonblamable paternalism.2 Presumptively
blamable benevolent paternalism "consists in treating adults
as if they were children ... by forcing them to act or forbear
in certain ways," for their own good, regardless of their
wishes in the matter."' Presumptively nonblamable pater-
nalism "consists of defending relatively helpless or vulnerable
people from external dangers, including harm from other
people when the protected parties have not voluntarily con-
sented to the risk, and doing this in a manner analogous in
its motivation and vigilance to that in which parents protect
their children."
2 74
The EEOC regulation relied on by Chevron in denying
Mr. Echazabal a job at its refinery is a presumptively blam-
able benevolent paternalistic regulation. It allows employers
to treat people with disabilities as children by forcing them to
forbear in certain ways, for their own good, regardless of their
own wishes in the matter, but does not do so in order to de-
fend relatively helpless or vulnerable people from a danger to
which they have not consented. The employee with a disabil-
ity is equally able to decide whether to consent to a known
workplace risk as are nondisabled employees.7 Moreover,
the employee with a disability has expressed his decision in
his employment choice. The EEOC threat-to-self regulation
allows employers to force people with disabilities to forbear
from making free and autonomous choices, even against their
own wishes, and thus discriminates against a person with a
disability in occupations which the employer believes are
more harmful to the person with a disability. On the other
hand, employers do not force nondisabled adults to forbear in
this manner.
In Echazabal, the Court held that the EEOC threat-to-
self regulation was an example of "good" paternalism,2 76 but
such a thing cannot exist under a classical liberal analysis.
Nonblamable paternalism involves protecting people from
risks to which they have not consented, but in Echazabal, the
employee with a disability has knowingly consented to the
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. At least Mr. Echazabal had that capacity; perhaps not all people with
disabilities will have that capacity.
276. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85-86 (2002).
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risk.277
Another useful analytic distinction is between paternalis-
tic laws applied in single-party cases278 and paternalistic laws
applied in two-party cases.7 9 Writing on this point in a 1970
article on paternalism, Gerald Dworkin applied the labels
"pure" and "impure" paternalism to the one- and two-party
cases, respectively.280 This distinction alone cannot support
the Supreme Court's analysis, however, because the cases
analyzed here, such as Echazaba, are one-party cases. The
only person harmed by his decision is Echazabal himself. Put
otherwise, the EEOC regulation is an example of "pure" pa-
ternalism because it seeks to prevent harm to the very class
of persons whose liberty is being restricted. In cases involv-
ing solely harm to self, as in Echazaba], the direct threat de-
fense protects no other class of people.
The employer can protect himself from liability by requir-
ing the employee with a disability who poses a threat to him-
self to sign a liability waiver. The employer can inform the
employee with a disability of the risks associated with per-
forming the functions of the job and recommend that the em-
ployee refuse the job or waive his or her right to seek later re-
course for harm caused from the risk assumed.
Although this regulation is a paternalistic infringement
upon the liberty of a person with a disability to alienate his
skills on the labor market, an employer will argue that it is
an acceptable infringement based on the employer's aim of
avoiding violations of workplace safety regulations, such as
277. Id. at 76-77.
278. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 9. Examples are "laws prohibiting suicide,
self-mutilation, and drug use." Id.
279. Id. at 9. Examples are "laws prohibiting euthanasia, dueling and drug
sales." Id.
280. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW (Richard A.
Wasserstrom, ed., 1971). Feinberg suggests "that the terms 'direct' and 'indi-
rect' paternalism are more fitting [because] two-party cases are paternalistic in
a less genuine, watered down sort of way." FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 9.
Dworkin argues that in the case of direct paternalism, the class of persons
whose liberty is being restricted is identical with the class of persons whose
harm is intended to be prevented by the restrictions. Dworkin, supra, at 111.
(Examples are making suicide a crime, requiring passengers to wear seat belts,
and requiring a Christian Scientist to receive a blood transfusion). In the case
of indirect paternalism, the only way to protect the welfare of the class of per-
sons is to restrict the freedom of other persons besides those who are benefited.
Id.
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the OSH Act.281 In Johnson Controls, the company argued
that it faced tort liability for employing fertile women in posi-
tions with a potential for injury to the female's fetus.282 The
Supreme Court, however, clearly stated that absent negli-
gence, a court would not likely find liability on the part of the
employer. 22  The Court reasoned that if "under general tort
principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal protection policies,
the employer fully informs the woman of the risks, and the
employer has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an
employer liable seems remote at best.,
284
The same would hold true under the ADA. In the absence
of negligence, a court likely would not find liability on the
part of the employer. Since the ADA bans employment ac-
tions based on threats to self, if the employer has not acted
negligently, and has fully informed the person with a disabil-
ity of the possible risks, and has obtained a signed waiver re-
lating to those risks, the basis for holding an employer liable
is remote. In sum, the EEOC regulation at issue here is a co-
ercive paternalistic regulation that restricts the liberty of
people with disabilities in order to prevent them from harm-
ing themselves.
Liberal theorists, such as Feinberg, argue that paternal-
ist justification of any restriction of personal liberty is ex-
tremely offensive because it invades the realms of personal
autonomy where each competent, responsible adult should
have absolute power.28 That power is to make decisions
about things that affect himself. Constraints justified on pa-
ternalistic grounds evoke more than feelings of frustration
and hostility.8 6  Paternalism, even in benevolent forms,
evokes feelings of moral indignation and outrage.287  Com-
plaints are not based solely on being inconvenienced or
"irked," but rather on the person's feelings that he has been
violated, invaded, and belittled.288 These feelings involve pro-
test: "What I do with my own life is no one else's business. 288
281. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84.
282. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 208-11 (1991).
283. Id. at 208.
284. Id.
285. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 25.
286. Id. at 27.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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A sense of one's rightful prerogatives being usurped provokes
these feelings."' Moreover, the justification for the paternal-
istic invasions into the private liberties of people with a dis-
ability "rub salt in their wound" by telling them that their de-
cisions about what is in their best interest really are not in
their best interest.291 Thus, the regulation relied on by Chev-
ron usurped the personal autonomy of Mr. Echazabal to de-
cide what ultimately was in his best interest.
"A distinctive feature of market transactions is that peo-
ple make decisions reflective of their individual circum-
stances. ,29 2 "Thus, a voluntary transaction necessarily im-
proves the welfare of all participants in the market
transaction, making them better off with respect to their pre-
vious situation."'93  Market transactions also allow for the
compensation of individuals for bearing the risk of employ-
ment.9 4 When people with disabilities are allowed to alienate
their labor in the market, then the riskier the job, the more
compensation an individual receives from the marketplace for
assuming such risks.295 If we allow the marketplace to oper-
ate in a normal fashion, just as the marketplace sets the price
for risky jobs for nondisabled workers, the market place
would do the same for workers with disabilities who pose a
risk only to themselves. When it comes to risky employment,
each individual must decide whether the risk is too high for
the benefit he will receive from such employment. Therefore,
if the price is not sufficient for the individual to accept the
risk of employment, that particular individual will not accept
the risk. This holds true for nondisabled workers as well as
workers with disabilities.
The goal of the ADA is "to assure equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency" for people with disabilities.29 The ADA embodies
a national policy that encourages self-reliance and self-
sufficiency.297 The ADA encourages people with disabilities to
290. Id.
291. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 27.
292. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEG. STUDIES 843, 846 (June 2000).
293. Id. at 846.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Radin, supra note 12, at 1898.
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2003); discussion supra text accompanying
notes 81, 87.
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take chances and to become full participants in society.298 For
instance, the ADA encourages visually impaired people to
walk down a busy city street to become independent, hearing-
impaired people to obtain employment as bus drivers, and
mentally disabled people to use public transportation to move
through their daily lives. Therefore, the ADA recognizes that
feelings of dignity and self-worth come from accepting risks.
Another way of analyzing the problem in the Supreme
Court's Echazabal opinion is to look at the Greek concept of
personal autonomy. Personal autonomy describes the realm
of inviolable sanctuary that consists of our own bodies. 99 The
word "autonomy" is derived from the Greek stems for "self'
and "law" or "rule" and literally means "the having or making
of one's own laws."300 Autonomy is known by such terms as
"self-rule," "self-determination," "self-government," and "in-
dependence." 01 To use an example of Feinberg's, if a person
voluntarily chooses to have a surgical operation that will ren-
der that person infertile and a physician is willing to perform
the operation, then the person's "bodily autonomy" is in-
fringed if the state forbids the operation on such grounds as
wickedness or imprudence.0 2 If no other interests are directly
involved, the decision is the person's own and "nobody else's
business," or "a matter between the person and his/her doctor
only." ' If one's body is included in one's sovereign domain, it
cannot be treated in certain ways without one's consent.0"
Thus, the concept of a discretionary competence implies both
negative rights00 and positive rights.3 6
Every person's discretionary control of his body is not the
end of personal autonomy.0 ' Another portion of the idea of
298. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2003); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 U.S. 73, 85-86 (2002).
299. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 27.
300. Id
301. Id.
302. Id. at 53.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 53. A "negative right" is a right to resist
doing certain things, such as the right not to have surgery imposed on oneself
against one's will. Id
306. Id. A "positive right" is a right to do what one wishes, such as "the right
to have surgery performed on oneself if one voluntarily chooses - and the sur-
geon is willing." Id.
307. Id. at 54.
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autonomy is the right to be able to make choices and decisions
such as what job to take, "what to put into my body, what
contacts with my body to permit, [and] where and how to
move my body through public space.""3 ' "Some of these rights
are more basic . . . and more indispensable than others." °9
Put another way:
[T]he most basic autonomy right is the right to decide how
one is to live one's life, in particular how to make critical
life decisions-what courses of study to take, what skills
and virtues to cultivate, what career to enter, whom or
whether to marry, which church if any to join, [or]
whether to have children.310
A person's personal domain then consists of his body and,
at the very least, his vital life-decisions." One such life-
decision is the right to sell one's labor for whatever price one
so chooses on the same terms as all other autonomous adult
actors. "According to those principles, we may locate within
the personal domain all those decisions that are 'self-
regarding,"' including decisions about employment. 12 For
example, in Echazabal, Mr. Echazabal wanted to work in a
job that may have caused him liver damage in the future, but
this decision was self-regarding, as it only would affect him.1
Despite the potential risks to himself, he may have wanted
the job because it was the highest paying job he could secure,
because he enjoyed working in the industry or at that particu-
lar work place, or because he and his doctors assessed the
risks differently than his employer did. Regardless of his rea-
sons, which are not mentioned in the published opinion,
Echazabal's own good and his right to exercise his autono-
mous choice were closely related.314 Indeed, Feinberg and Mill
would argue that in the majority of cases, an individual
knows better than anyone else what is good for him,35 and
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 55.
312. Id. at 56. "Self-regarding" decisions mean those decisions that "primar-
ily and directly affect only the interests of the decision-maker." Id.
313. Some would argue that if Mr. Echazabal died prematurely and left a
family in need, his decision did not affect him only. However, that argument is
beyond the scope of this article.
314. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 58.
315. Id.
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that "allowing individuals, whenever possible, to choose for
themselves, even to choose risky courses, is the policy most
likely to promote their personal fulfillment, even though in
some cases individuals may predictably exercise their
autonomous choice unwisely."316 Outside the personal domain
are all those decisions that are also "other-regarding. 317
However, even if his reasons are not regarded as good
reasons, one must concede that he is making a perfectly valid,
voluntary choice based on his own standards.31 Although his
choice may seem unreasonable from others' perspectives or
may be one that others could never make, it is not necessarily
an insane or irrational choice. 9 Many able-bodied people
would not accept the risks that a person with a disability
would accept, but able-bodied people do not have the experi-
ence to allow full appreciation of the liberty and dignity inter-
ests that might lend a person with a disability to make a
risky choice that advances personal autonomy. If the chooser
is an autonomous adult making a voluntary decision, the
choice must be his to make and not anyone else's in order to
promote a regime of equal civil rights.3" A completely
autonomous adult would have, in Mill's words, the "power of
voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life.
321
V. CONCLUSION
"Just tell us, if you would, why the employee would want
to take a job where the doctor says it's going to kill you? 3 22
Justice Kennedy posed this question during the oral argu-
ments for Chevron v. Echazaba, even though the case did not
present these facts. The answer to this question is "because
he is an autonomous adult, capable of making his own risk
assessments once provided with the relevant information, and
316. Id.
317. Id. "Other-regarding" decisions mean those decisions that directly and
in the first instance affect the interests or sensibilities of other persons. Id.
318. Id. at 69.
319. Id. For example, a person who is hearing impaired may want to work as
a city bus driver because the person may enjoy driving a bus, earn a living, or
figure that the job is an exceptional way to meet people, even though non-
disabled people may view this decision as unreasonable or irrational.
320. FEINBERG, supra note 263, at 69.
321. Id.
322. Oral Agruments, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal (Feb. 27, 2002)
(question posed by Justice Kennedy).
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under the ADA's antipaternalism principle he should be al-
lowed to work anywhere he wants, as long as he is not put-
ting anyone else in danger." The ADA was created with the
purpose of giving people with disabilities the same civil rights
as those of other adults in society. One of those rights is the
right to make one's own decisions about what kinds of em-
ployment-related risks to bear. The EEOC interpretive regu-
lation does not allow the purpose of the ADA to be fully real-
ized. This regulation is thus a presumptively blamable
paternalistic infringement on the right of a person with a dis-
ability to decide what is in his best interest, because it allows
an employer to substitute his judgment for that of a person
with a disability.
Over the years, disability legislation has evolved from
treating people with disabilities as having defects that need
to be cured to integrating them as full members of society en-
titled to equal rights to self-worth, autonomy, and personal
dignity. The Supreme Court's history with paternalistic legis-
lation shows that paternalistic rules are upheld when the
safety of others is in jeopardy. In Echazabal, however, the
Supreme Court incorrectly decided that for people with dis-
abilities, paternalistic rules are justified when there is a
threat to the individual himself, even when there are no
threats to others. That decision restricts the ability of people
with disabilities to sell their labor in the market on the same
terms as other employees, and as a result, sets back the cam-
paign for equal employment rights for persons with disabili-
ties.
323. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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